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Abstract
Using the event-study methodology and multivariate regressions, this paper examines
the intensity of media coverage, its determinants and its marginal eﬀect on stock returns
following chemical disasters. To do this, we build an original dataset of chemical explosions
that occurred worldwide from 1990-2005. First, our results show that news coverage increases
with the social and environmental consequences of the accident. Second, to deal with the fact
that news coverage is determined simultaneously with stock returns, we suggest two valid
and original instrumental variables: a measure of the ﬁrm’s newsworthiness and a measure of
daily news pressure at the time of the disaster. We ﬁnd that unexpected news coverage due
to chemical disasters also respond to these conjunctural factors, and is truly exogenous to
abnormal returns. Third, we show that, all else being equal (pollution, number of casualties,
and ﬁrm proﬁle), the stock market reaction to intense press coverage is delayed, and becomes
negative in the long-term. At the same time, there is clear evidence that in the ﬁrst days
news coverage mitigates the market value losses. We interpret these results as evidence that
investors are slow to recognize the extent of the loss associated with the public implications
of news coverage (e.g., image and public trust deterioration). In addition, in contrast to
previous studies, we argue that press coverage is not necessarily associated with increased
investor attention.
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11 Introduction
Over the last three decades, we have witnessed several environmental disasters. In many cases,
large companies were involved. Union Carbide was responsible for the Bhopal explosion in 1984,
Exxon for the Valdez oil spill in 1989, and BP for a large chemical explosion in Texas in 2005.
All these events, which provoked either numerous deaths or serious pollution, were followed by
enormous news coverage. It is commonly assumed that environmental disasters deteriorate the
ﬁrm’s public image and its reputation. Stock market value and public image are often considered
as the two major motives that may induce ﬁrms to reduce the negative externalities they create.
According to some, these two motives may complement, or even substitute for, the incentives
provided by public regulation.1
To be eﬀective, incentives coming from the stock market or from the public need to be ex-post
credible, systematic, and proportional to the social cost entailed. Moreover, it is evident that
reliable information about the ﬁrm environmental record is needed to discipline corporate behav-
ior. Finally, concerning the reaction of stock markets, the incorporation of news about pollution
and the social consequences of accidents into prices relies on the eﬃcient market hypothesis,
which rests upon strong assumptions about the cognitive abilities of investors.
In this article, we investigate the intensity of media coverage, its determinants and its
marginal eﬀect on stock returns following chemical disasters. More speciﬁcally, we wonder
whether intense news coverage after an environmental disaster represents an additional cost
to the ﬁrm. The drop in stock returns is used as a measure of uninsured cost, while media
coverage is taken as a proxy for public image deterioration suﬀered by the ﬁrm. Moreover, we
investigate the following questions. Are stock market and media response proportional to the
social cost of the accident? Are pollution and safety news correctly incorporated into stock
prices? What is the mechanism through which media inﬂuence stock markets after an accident?
Is intensity of media coverage a good proxy for reputation damage? To our knowledge, virtually
no empirical study has examined this issue.
To carry out our analysis, we build an original sample of explosions in chemical plants and
reﬁneries worldwide from 1990 to 2005. The software Factiva was used to search in a systematic
way for the press articles mentioning companies responsible for disasters. Also, this search
allowed us to build a number of variables of interest measuring the social consequences of each
disaster, such as the number of fatalities and injuries and the occurrence of pollution.
The consequences on reputation of news coverage has been the subject of recent papers in
the literature. For instance, Kyanazeva (2007) ﬁnds that media plays a disciplinary role on
executives. Besides, in political science, media coverage is usually considered as a good proxy
for public concern. In our study, this eﬀect is particularly important. If the space devoted
to chemical disasters in the media is a good indicator of its importance for the public, it may
convey information about its legal consequences (clean-up cost, penalties, etc.) and might even
indicate law reinforcement in the future (Kahn, 2007). In environmental economics, a number of
event-studies show that stock prices incorporate the loss associated with pollution and industrial
disaster news, and might conﬁrm the credibility of stock market penalties as a disciplinary motive
(for a survey see Margolis et al., 2007). But, they limit their attention to short-term results (a
few days after the announcement date), and largely ignore the ability of media to shape the
informational environment of ﬁrms (Bushee et al., 2007).2
1For example, in a survey conducted by PriceWaterhouseCoopers among French ﬁrms, 90% of the managers
cite public image as the main motivation to promote corporate social responsability inside the ﬁrm. See also
McKinsey (2006, 2008).
2In a seminal study about the stock market reaction to the TRI announcement, Hamilton (1995) also intends
to control for media coverage. He shows that whether the ﬁrms’ pollution records received media coverage did
2Besides its consequences on public image, news coverage can aﬀect stock prices for other
reasons. Recent studies in empirical ﬁnance recognize the role of media as an information in-
termediary, uncovering and summarizing information that is sometimes costly to acquire and
thereby increasing the number of informed investors or reducing the cost of contracting (Dyck
et al., 2006, Bushee et al., 2007). The seminal paper of Fang and Peress (2007) shows that ﬁrms
which beneﬁt from higher news coverage incur lower expected returns, due to the fact that media
coverage reduces information risk. Bushee et al. (2007) investigate the stock market response
to earnings announcements. They ﬁnd that greater press coverage increases public informa-
tion about ﬁrms as measured by greater absolute returns and trading volume at the time of an
earning announcement. In our study, this issue is particularly important because informational
asymmetry between owners and managers is exacerbated by the diﬃculty of assessing the dis-
tribution of pollution and safety risks at the ﬁrm level (i.e. the ﬁrm’s environmental and safety
reputation). Furthermore, a great deal of uncertainty surrounds liability, insurance coverage,
and litigation risk. In particular, uncertainty surrounding pollution news might explain why the
stock market penalties as evidenced in the literature on pollution news are relatively low in the
short term (Laguna, 2008). Thus, our second central hypothesis is that media in the event of
disasters might help alleviate these informational problems.
Finally, there is a growing literature on the role of the media on stock markets characterized
by the presence of cognitively biased investors. According to this literature, media alleviate
bounded rationality problems such as inattention and limited capacity of information treatment.
Chan (2003) uses headlines to represent the public nature of news as opposed to private signals
(as measured by extreme price movements unaccompanied by press coverage). The main result
of Chan (2003) is that prices are slow to reﬂect bad public news, and that reversal is found in the
subsequent month after important price movements. In other words, investors appear to under-
react to public signals and overreact to perceived private signals. On the other hand, Peress
(2008) ﬁnds that news coverage has an attention-grabbing eﬀect which favors the incorporation
of earning news into stock prices. At the same time, his result and the study of Hirshleifer, Lim,
and Teoh (2007) also show that the attention paid to earning announcements decreases if the
number of available (and unrelated) news stories is greater on the same day. This interpretation
is more behavioral than rational: media variables are used as exogenous measures of investor
attention or news salience.
In this paper, in order to study the causal eﬀect of news coverage on stock returns, we ﬁrst
investigate the determinants of media coverage. This research question is not a trivial one and
raises a number of empirical problems. First, news coverage is determined simultaneously with
stock returns. Second, the fact that stock returns reﬂect all public information available may lead
to a potential endogeneity bias. More speciﬁcally, news coverage and stock market response may
be be correlated even if the number of news stories has no eﬀect on returns, because they both
depend on other and unrelated newsworthy materials about the ﬁrm at the time of the disaster.
For instance, the ﬁrm might be in the public eye for diﬀerent reasons (threat of takeover, an
earning announcement, etc.), and this may induce more disaster news coverage. Conceptually,
this is a diﬃcult question to analyze, because we must think of a situation where news coverage
could vary exogenously, even though in the data stock returns and news coverage are generated
simultaneously (Wooldridge, 2002). At least one instrumental variable is required, a variable
which is exogenous to the unexplained part of the stock market returns and at the same time
strongly correlated with news coverage. In this article, as instrumental variable, we use the
ﬁrm’s abnormal media coverage in the twenty days before the disaster to proxy for the ﬁrm’s
newsworthiness. In addition, we conjecture that the attention paid to chemical accidents by the
not inﬂuence the stock market value loss incurred by ﬁrms.
3press in a given period is driven by political agenda issues. In other words, attention may be
crowded out by other, more important political events at the time of the disaster.3 Therefore,
we use a measure of news pressure provided by Eisensee and Strömberg (2007). News pressure,
which is deﬁned as the availability of other newsworthy material on a given day (elections,
Olympics, wars, etc.), is a good candidate because it is a time-varying factor, independent of
the accident occurrence as well as of the ﬁrm’s idiosyncratic risk. This measure has not been
used before in the ﬁnancial literature. News pressure will constitute an alternative instrumental
variable.
Therefore, from an empirical standpoint, our paper contributes to the literature by examining
further the media coverage determinants, and by testing the exogeneity of news coverage to
abnormal returns. From an economic standpoint, few studies examine the implications on the
public of pollution and safety news as measured by news coverage metrics. More speciﬁcally, to
our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study to use market value loss associated with news coverage to
proxy for image deterioration and reputation.
Our results can be summarized as follows. First, by modeling the determinants of media,
we ﬁnd that news coverage is explained by the social cost of the accident, as measured by the
occurrence of pollution, and by the number of casualties, as well as by the number of accidents
previously experienced by each ﬁrm. Second, we surprisingly ﬁnd that in the short term (i.e.,
two days after the accident), all else being equal, media coverage lowers the market penalty.
More precisely, more intense media coverage actually mitigates the ﬁnancial drop incurred by
ﬁrms responsible for the accident. However, when considering the average stock returns over the
six months after the accident, the ﬁrms that received more important media coverage in the ﬁrst
two days after the disaster also incur lower abnormal returns regardless of the seriousness of the
accident. In other words, the reaction to intense press coverage reverses (it becomes negative)
in the long-term, and it is a delayed reaction. Therefore, we interpret this result as evidence
that press coverage cannot be associated with increased attention. If this were the case, the
loss should have increased with media instantenously (e.g., due to a greater number of informed
investors).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 describes the econometric
model. Sections 3 describes the data, and the instrumental variables. The results are presented
in Section 4 and 5. The paper concludes with a summary in Section 6.
2 Methodology
In this article, I study the determinants and the implications of intense news coverage on abnor-
mal returns following a chemical disaster, as measured by the event-study methodology (MacKin-
lay, 1997). From an empirical standpoint, the main problem raised by the use of news coverage
metrics is related to the exogeneity of media with regards to new information arrival. News
salience or stock visibility as measured by intense media coverage (or headlines in major news-
papers) is diﬃcult to disentangle from a pure information eﬀect on stock returns.
2.1 News Coverage Bias and Event-study Econometrics
In this article, we attempt to relate the response of journalists to that of investors in the event
of chemical disasters. This question raises a number of empirical issues.
3Eisensee and Strömberg (2007) show that the news coverage of natural hazards depends on the occurrence
(or absence) of competing and more important news that capture the attention of mass media at the time of the
disasters.
4Can News Selection by the Press Be Ignored? Since the late 1990s, the problem of
sample selection bias has received much attention in the empirical ﬁnance literature (e.g. Fama,
1998, Prabhala, 1997, Li and Prabhala, 2005). A criticism has been made that samples were
sometimes deﬁned in an ad-hoc manner by the researcher in order to "dredge for anomalies"
(Fama, 1998). Moreover, in many cases, announcements could not be considered as exogenous
to the ﬁrm’s choice (e.g. tender oﬀers, stock splits, etc.). Chemical disasters, in contrast, can be
considered as low-discretion and unexpected events, so that manipulation or selection of news
announcement dates by ﬁrms is almost impossible.
Yet, in this sub-section, we focus on a new and unstudied issue: the selection of news
announcements or corporate events by the press. In most event-studies, sample of events collected
in the press cannot be considered as random. This is due to the fact that journalists track what
they perceive as the most important (or newsworthy) news in a given day. To be disclosed
or announced by journalists, the net value associated with the publication of news needs to
be perceived as positive. Media coverage might then give rise to sample selection bias. But
does this problem really matters, and does it have implications for the estimation of population
parameters?
There is reason to suspect that only the least serious accidents (either in terms of pollution,
human harm, or physical damage) would be ignored by the press. Let s be a binary selection
indicator representing a random draw from the population. By deﬁnition, s = 1 if we use the
draw in the estimation, and s = 0 if we do not. In our study, s = 1 if at least once article
is published about the chemical disaster. Most often, we do not use observations when s = 0
because data on x (explanatory variables) or y (dependant variables) are unobserved. The key
assumption underlying the validity of ordinary least squares on selected sample as demonstrated
by Wooldridge (2002, p.553) is that E(ujx;s) = 0. However, if only the most serious accidents
appear in the press, so that s is a deterministic function of x, therefore, it follows from the
assumption E(ujx) = 0 that E(ujx;s) = E(ujx), and the assumption E(ujx;s) = 0 holds. In
that case, sample selection can be ignored, and the population parameters can be estimated
using ordinary least squares.
The Simultaneity Bias. News coverage is determined simultaneously along with stock
returns, as illustrated by the fact that the most severe disasters will appear more often in the
news and will induce higher equity losses. Second, the fact that stock returns reﬂect all publicly
available information also raises a potential endogeneity bias. Finally, news coverage and stock
market response will be correlated even if the number of news stories has no eﬀect on returns,
because they both depend on other newsworthy materials at the time of disasters. The basic
econometric problem is that there are many aspects of the disaster salience to the public that
we cannot observe, for example, the direct cost of the disaster, or unobserved competing shocks
aﬀecting the ﬁrm. Consequently, residuals from the outcome variable may be correlated with the
regressors, and we cannot identify the causal eﬀect of news on stock markets from a regression
of the latter on the former. Using a measure of unexpected media coverage (i.e. the media
coverage associated with the chemical disasters) certainly alleviates this problem, but it is not
suﬃcient to tackle the simultaneity problem if we suspect that media coverage also responds to
ﬁrm newsworthiness at the time of disasters.
Conceptually, this is a diﬃcult situation to analyze, because we must think of a situation
where news coverage could vary exogenously, even though in the data stock returns and news
coverage are generated simultaneously (Wooldridge, 2002). To counter this simultaneity bias, at
least one instrumental variable is required, a variable which is exogenous to the unexplained part
of the stock market returns, and at the same time strongly correlated with the news coverage.
Therefore, to determine whether news has a causal eﬀect on stock markets, we use two sets of
instrumental variables, namely ﬁrm newsworthiness and news pressure at the time of disasters
5(see the Data section below).
2.2 A Triangular Recursive Equation System
This paper assumes that stock market returns following chemical disasters depend on the mag-
nitude of the news coverage, and on the seriousness of the disaster. At the same time, the news
coverage magnitude depends on the same variables, and on a set of instrumental variables as
described below.4
Our econometric speciﬁcation is of the following form. In our system, for each ﬁrm-disaster
i, the dependant variable is CARi;[0;+t], the cumulated abnormal returns up to t days after the
accident date, and the endogenous regressor is NEWSi;[0;+t], the cumulated number of news
articles reporting the disaster i up to t days after the accident date. The vector i contains
disaster speciﬁc variables, such as the number of fatalities and serious injuries, a dummy for
toxic release, but also, ﬁrm speciﬁc variables, number of previous accidents experienced, and
ﬁxed eﬀects for country, time period, etc. Thus, for each ﬁrm-disaster i, and t days after the
accident date (t = 0), and 8t = 0;1;2, the two-equation system is triangular as follows:
NEWSi;[0;+t] = 1ABNNEWSi;t=[ 2; 22] + 2NEWSPRESSUREt + 0i + i (1)
CARi;[0;+t] = 
1NEWSi;[0;+t] + 
0i + i (2)
Note ﬁrst that we assume that the increase in the ﬁrm news coverage after t = 0 is entirely due
to the chemical disaster, since NEWSi;[0;+t] measures the total number of news articles published
about the accident (and not about the ﬁrm i). Our central hypothesis to control for exogenous
variations of the disaster news coverage is that disasters are more likely to be covered when the
ﬁrm is more newsworthy, as well as when at the time of disasters, important political events
break into the news (war, terrorist attacks, etc.), as respectively captured by the two variables
ﬁrm newsworthiness (ABNNEWSi;t=[ 2; 22]) and news pressure (NEWSPRESSUREt) as
described in the Data section below.
Empirically, several methodologies are implemented. First, our system of simultaneous equa-
tions is triangular, in that we assume that abnormal returns depend on the media coverage, but
not the opposite. If the disturbances i and i are uncorrelated, then the system is a fully
recursive model. In this case, the entire system may be estimated consistently and eﬃciently
by ordinary least squares. In the more general case, in which the residual covariance matrix is
not diagonal, the preceding argument does not apply, and we have to implement a two-stage
least squares (TSLS). Assuming a linear model and assuming that the instrument variables are
uncorrelated with the unobserved part of the stock market reactions, i, and unobserved news
coverage, i, conditional on the variables in i, the model is identiﬁed and the parameters may
be consistently estimated using two-stage least squares.
3 Background and Data
In this section, we present the dataset, and how the media coverage associated to each disaster
as well the instrumental variables are computed.
4The system is triangular or recursive rather than simultaneous, with X entering the equation determining Y
, but not the other way around. This diﬀers from the recursive form of the general simultaneous equations model
(e.g., Hausman, 1983), where the recursive nature is by construction. In contrast to the recursive form in such
linear simultaneous equations models the unobserved components are potentially correlated (Greene, 1993).
63.1 The sample of accidents
There is no global, publicly available list of the major chemical disasters that disclose the names
of companies responsible for disasters.5 To identify the chemical disasters, we compiled a corpus
of print media articles for the period 1990-2005. A systematic search using the software Factiva
was carried out. This software covers all major newspapers and publications in the world. We
selected all news articles written in English (over 10,000). The search was carried out using two
keywords: "explosion" and "chemical plant", and excludes all accidents reported by newspapers
before 1990 and after 2005. Using the two keywords, we started with about 200 events. Of
these, two-thirds were eliminated because they do not involve publicly traded companies (they
concerned state-owned companies, illegal factories, etc.). Datastream, which covers more than
75% of publicly listed companies in the world, was used to identify a sample of 38 publicly traded
companies responsible for the remaining 64 accidents.6 Half of the ﬁrms are big multinationals
and are among the 50 biggest ﬁrms in the chemical industry in terms of sales. In our sample,
there are also smaller ﬁrms which have sales below US$2 million.7 The ﬁrms are listed on
the stock markets of ten developed countries (Australia, France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands,
Norway, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom, the United States) and two emerging countries
(South Africa and South Korea).8
3.2 Dependant variables
In the regression system, news coverage of chemical disasters (NEWSi;[0;+t]) is the endogenous
regressor, and the cumulated abnormal return after the disaster (CARi;[0;+t]) is the dependant
variable.
Disaster news coverage. Data on news coverage is taken from the software Factiva. We
restrict the attention to newspaper articles, and count all articles in English and for all regions
mentioning both the names of companies, the disaster, but also the town (or the country) where
the accident took place to ensure we account for the disasters and not for other events (for
instance a reﬁnery explosion due to warfare in a less developed country).
Two main measures of news coverage are considered: the total number of news articles on a
daily basis (Newst), and the cumulated number of news articles up to t days after the accident
(Cum:News[0;+t]).9 Overall, our measures are in line with the new literature on the implications
of news coverage for stock market returns which use the total number of articles mentioning the
ﬁrm name or a speciﬁc event depending on the subject matter.10 As in the studies of Bushee et
al. (2007) and of Fang and Peress (2007), we are interested in the intensity of news coverage,
and not in the information content of news coverage. But, in contrast to previous literature, it is
5In Europe, since the accident of Seveso in Italy in the mid-seventies, all ﬁrms are obliged to notify accidents
to public authorities. In the US, the Environmental Protection Agency provides a complete list of chemical
accidents that have occurred in the US since the 1990s. But, due to a principle of commercial conﬁdentiality, the
names of companies responsible for accidents are not usually disclosed, at least outside the US.
6The dataset was built in a related paper (Capelle-Blancard and Laguna, 2006).
7Daiichi Pharm., Lubrizol, Crompton, Albright&Wilson, Guerbet, and Lonza Group.
8See Table 1 for more details.
9The latter measures ignores the autocorrelated nature of press coverage, while measures of press coverage on
a daily basis are well suited to measure information dissemination on stock markets. We also consider the natural
logarithm of the number of press articles to account for the fact that the coverage distribution is right-tailed. See
below for more details.
10Bushee et al. (2007) which investigates the eﬀect of the ﬁrm’s news coverage on its stock market returns
before and after earnings announcements ﬁnds that using the total number of words instead of the total number
of articles do not change the results. Another strand of literature dedicated to the journalist’s decision to cover
an event uses by contrast an indicator variable for whether a speciﬁc event is covered in a news broadcast within
a certain time window (Erﬂe and McMillan, 1990; Hamilton, 1995; Eisensee and Strömberg, 2007).
7worth noting that our measure of intensity of press coverage is a measure of unexpected media
coverage in the event of chemical disaster. It deliberately does not incorporate the total number
of news stories published in the disaster period.11
The median number of press articles published about the disaster in the ﬁrst three days is
10, and the average number is 32 articles. 12 Moreover, the correlation between media coverage
on day t = 0 (the accident day) and day t = 1 is far lower (64%) than between media coverage
on day t = 1 (the accident day) and day t = 2, which is of 97%. As shown in Figure ??, 80% of
the press articles published in the ten days following disasters are printed in the ﬁrst four days:
21.82%, 34.66%, 17.14% and 5.63% of news stories are reported respectively the ﬁrst, second,
third, and fourth days. These results conﬁrm the fact that media coverage is partially delayed,
but concentrated in the ﬁrst two days. Yet, 19% of accidents do not receive media coverage in
the ﬁrst two days, and 36% of accidents do not receive coverage on the ﬁrst day. Among this
sub-group, as expected, the average number of injuries is also lower, in accordance with the fact
that less serious accidents receive delayed, lower, or no media coverage. The average number of
injuries for this sub-group is 0.33 injuries, whereas the average number for the 33 accidents which
receive immediate coverage is 3.93 injuries. Finally, some accidents cause the distribution of the
number of press articles to be right-tailed as shown in Figure 1. In fact, this eﬀect is mainly due
to the media coverage of an important chemical explosion in Texas on March 23, 2005. When
this accident is excluded, the density of news articles in the ﬁrst two days is normally distributed.
Cumulative abnormal returns. The second dependant variable is the cumulated abnor-
mal return up to t days after the accident (CARi;[0;+t]). CARi;[0;+t] =
P=t
=0 ARi; where ARi;
stands for the abnormal return on day . Abnormal returns represent prediction errors from the
market model parameters estimated with ordinary least squares through the period [-190; -10]
in days relative to the accident date.
3.3 Instrument Choice
In this sub-section, we present the set of instruments we use to control for exogenous variations
in the disaster news coverage, irrespective of accident seriousness.
News Pressure and accident newsworthiness. The variable NEWSPRESSUREt is
provided by Eisensee and Strömberg (2007) and measures the median (across broadcasts in a
day) number of minutes a news broadcast devotes to the top three news segments in a day. We
ﬁrst consider that other major political or public events may crowd out the coverage of disaster
events. In contrast, in periods of news drought, disasters may draw the attention of journalists
and investors to a greater extent. Thus, measures of the availability of other newsworthy material
may be used as instruments. The intuition underlying this instrument variable is straightforward:
journalists and editorial boards have a ﬁxed number of words to write and pages to ﬁll each day.
If the amount of space taken up by big news stories is high, the space that can be devoted to other
news stories is reduced, and therefore these other news stories may be crowded out (Eisensee
and Strömberg, 2007). The variable is available from 1968-2003, and to our knowledge, this is
the ﬁrst study to document the implications of news pressure on stock market outcomes.13
11An alternative speciﬁcation would have considered the abnormal media coverage in the post-event period, as
measured by the diﬀerence between the media coverage on the accident day and the average media coverage in
the pre-event period. This measure would have the advantage of accounting for the eﬀect of other newsworthy
material before and after the accident, but it is also more noisy.
12We also consider mentions in headlines only. The resulting variable is correlated at the 99% level with the
number of mentions in the full article and our results do not change.
13Since the variable daily news pressure is available only before 2004, it reduces our size sample by almost ten
observations.
8In the Appendix, Figure 2 plots daily news pressure from 1968 to 2003. From 1990 to
2003, the average median time spent on top three news segments each day is of 7.8 minutes on
average, with a standard error of 2.6 minutes (a max of 29.7 and a minimum of 1 minute). The
autocorrelation of the variable daily news pressure is not high, less than 55% in one day-lag, and
of less than 45% for a two-day lag. In our sample, on the accident day, the autocorrelation is
even lower, around 25%, and between the two following days (t = 1 and t = 2), of 60%. Finally,
a dummy is set at one for disasters occurring in July and August to control for the eﬀect of
summertime news droughts. For the same reasons, a dummy is used to control for accidents
that occurred during the week-end.
The only problem raised by this variable is that events associated with a high level of news
pressure include terrorist attacks and war-related events. Such events may increase concern about
chemical explosions rather than reducing it, because public concern over war and terrorism, even
before September 11, is also related to the threat of terrorist attacks on industrial plants. Thus,
the overall eﬀect of news pressure on the press coverage of chemical disasters is diﬃcult to predict
and unclear on average. As a preliminary test, we examine the level of news pressure on the
accident day in our sample. We compute summary statistics for the variable news pressure for
all accident days in our sample (based on 57 observations from 1990-2003). The average median
time spent on top the three news segments each day is of 8.45 minutes on the accident day,
and is slightly higher than for the overall sample (with a standard error of 3.55, a minimum
of 4.84, and a maximum of 29.25 minutes). Using a mean comparison test, we can reject at
the 5% level the null hypothesis that news pressure is not signiﬁcantly higher when a chemical
explosion occurs. This preliminary evidence reinforces our intuition that the accident coverage
may be not randomly selected conditional on the level of news pressure, so that E(News1|High
News Pressure)6=E(News1|Low News Pressure). In addition, this result could conﬁrm that the
news coverage of chemical disasters increases with the level of news pressure. Therefore, we also
control in every speciﬁcation for the period after September 11, when it is expected that concern
over terrorist attacks has increased.
Abnormal media coverage and ﬁrm newsworthiness. The variable ABNBEWSi;t=[ 22; 2]
represents the abnormal media coverage received by each ﬁrm shortly before the accident. It
is obtained by computing the ratio between the number of headlines that mention the ﬁrm in
the twenty days before a disaster and the total number of headlines received in the previous
year. This variable is meant to capture the visibility of the ﬁrm at the time of the incident.
Using the ratio should control for the fact that bigger ﬁrms that have more important Public
Relations budgets are more present in the media. This variable is equal to 5.5% on average, and
varies between 0 and 20%. This conﬁrms that some ﬁrms happen to be more newsworthy than
others at the time of disasters. We are agnostic about which events or shocks may explain ﬁrm
newsworthiness shortly before a disaster.
We conjecture that ﬁrms which beneﬁt from higher abnormal media coverage before the
disaster are more newsworthy and would also beneﬁt from higher abnormal media coverage
after the disaster, all else being equals. Firms which are more newsworthy should receive more
coverage in case of accidents, because they are already under the scrutiny of journalists. At the
same time, one may also argue that the accident occurrence is more salient to journalist if no
other breaking news are available about the ﬁrm. Overall, the eﬀect of the ﬁrm newsworthiness
shortly before the disaster is diﬃcult to predict. Finally, abnormal media coverage is potentially
due to ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks, which can be equally captured by other ﬁnancial-based measures of
informativeness: abnormal volumes, and absolute abnormal returns in the previous days are also
ideally suited to measure the ﬁrm’s salience in stock markets. Table 4 in the Appendix lists cross-
sectional regression of the ﬁrm newsworthiness on measures of abnormal market activity in the
twenty days before the disaster. Speciﬁcally, we document some correlation between abnormal
9trading volume and the ﬁrm newsworthiness, but, the result do not appear as signiﬁcant as
measured by the F-statistics of joint signiﬁcance. However, to avoid spurious regressions, we
include in every model speciﬁcation, a complete set of ﬁnancial control variables (see the next
section for more details).
3.4 Control Variables
We use a number of variables to control for the accident seriousness (its information content),
and structural eﬀects such as the listing country of the responsible ﬁrm, its industry, size, as well
as time dummies. These variables are expected to have an indirect eﬀect on the media coverage
and on the stock market responses, since they also aﬀect the ﬁrm and accident newsworthiness.
The information content of accidents. The distinctive characteristics of accidents are
also drawn from print media. Table 1 reports some descriptive statistics. We use three main
variables to control for the informativeness of accidents. First, the variable “Fatalities and serious
injuries” measures the number of injuries that were listed as “in serious condition” and the number
of fatalities due to the accident. More than half of the accidents resulted in at least one fatality
and a serious injury, while the average number of fatalities and serious injuries is 2.6. Second,
pollution (the variable “Toxic release”) is measured by a dummy set equal to one if we have
information that the¸accident resulted in a toxic release on the basis of the statements issued
by the authorities, environmentalist groups, and the companies themselves. In one quarter of
the accidents, the chemical release was toxic enough to contaminate the environment. Third,
the ﬁrm reputation is measured by the number of similar accidents previously experienced by
each ﬁrm.14 In the absence of perfect information, accident news constitute an informative
signal that investors use to infer the environmental riskiness of each ﬁrm. Thus, stock market
response should depend on the current accident but also on the previous safety and environmental
records of ﬁrms. Finally, we use four country variables to control for accidents that occurred in
the United Kingdom, in continental Europe, in Japan or in emerging countries (the reference
variable is when accident occurred in North-America), and two ﬁve year-dummies to control for
accidents that occurred between 1995 and 1999, and for accidents that occurred between 2000
and 2005.
Financial controls. In each regression, we include several standard ﬁnancial control vari-
ables to assess whether intensity of news coverage is able to explain abnormal returns above and
beyond already-known measures of information arrival and newsworthiness on stock markets.
We include the ﬁrm close-to-close abnormal returns on each of the previous two trading days
(ARi;t 1, and ARi;t 2), and, to reciprocate the ﬁrm newsworthiness instrument variable (as
measured by abnormal news coverage), we include cumulated abnormal returns in the twenty
days before the accident (CARi;[ 22; 2]), and the average percentage increase in volume mea-
sured within the twenty days before the accident date (AVi;[ 22; 2]) using the estimation period
t = [ 42; 32] to compute the expected level of trading volume.15 In addition, we control for
ﬁrm size and book-to-market ratios using each ﬁrm’s log of market capitalization and log of
book-to-market equity measured at the end of the most recent year. Obviously, in percentage
value, all else being equals, the drop in equity returns incurred by small ﬁrms should be higher.
Book-to-market is designed to control for ﬁrms in ﬁnancial distress.
14In principle, environmental risk at the ﬁrm level could be proxied by the participation to voluntary initia-
tives such as the ISO14000 management standard, or the GRI guidelines on environmental and social issues.
Unfortunately, these programs were launched at the end of the 1990s.
15Trading volume before the disaster as measured by the ratio of the number of shares traded to the number
of shares outstanding.
104 Results
4.1 What Drives the News Coverage of Chemical Disasters?
In this section, we document the disaster news coverage determinants in the ﬁrst days after the
accident date. Recall that disaster news coverage variables use the total number of newspaper
articles published about the accident.
OLS regressions are used to relate the cross-sectional variance in the disaster news cover-
age to the accident-speciﬁc features, the ﬁrm-speciﬁc features, and various standard controls.
Table 5 reports the results. Several measures of press coverage magnitude are used: the daily
number of newspaper articles from t = 0 to t = 1 in event-time (Newst); and, the cumulated
number of natural newspaper articles from t = 0 to t = 2 in event-time (Cum:News[0;+t]). In
the second set of regressions (columns (4)-(6)), our two time-varying instruments are included
in the regression models: the news pressure variable at the time of disasters; and the ﬁrm news-
worthiness shortly before the disaster (as measured by abnormal media coverage). Recall that
instruments have to be strongly correlated with the endogenous regressor (in our study, the news
coverage) to be relevant. It is worth noting that if we include instruments separately, results do
not change notably.
Newspapers focus their attention on accidents which provoke fatalities and serious injuries.
In every model speciﬁcation, the coeﬃcient for human harm is positive and statistically signif-
icant at the 5% level: One more fatality is associated with one additional newspaper article on
the accident day (see model (4) in Table 5 which has the highest R-squared). Results also show
evidence of a signiﬁcant non-linear eﬀect of the number of injuries and fatalities on the disaster
news coverage. The coeﬃcient associated with the squared number of fatalities and serious in-
juries is negative and signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Therefore, the marginal eﬀect of human harm
on the number of newspaper articles decreases with the total number of injuries and deaths
witnessed. The eﬀect of pollution (and subsequent social costs due to containment and evacua-
tion) is less robust. In columns (1)-(3), absent exclusion restrictions (instrument variables), the
eﬀect of the toxic release dummy on news coverage is positive and signiﬁcant at the 10% level,
but in speciﬁcations (4)-(6), the eﬀect is no longer signiﬁcant. Overall, the results conﬁrm that
press coverage is highly sensitive to the seriousness and social cost of accidents. Similarly, the
reputation of ﬁrms as measured by the number of previous accidents experienced by each ﬁrm is
crucial to explain the magnitude of the disaster news coverage. On the accident day, these two
variables help explain almost 50% of the news coverage variance (as measured by the adjusted
R-squared metric).
Surprisingly, most ﬁnancial control variables (unreported results) do not increase the ex-
planatory power of the regressions and in almost every speciﬁcation, coeﬃcients associated with
these variables are not signiﬁcant. However, regressions in columns (4)-(6) conﬁrm that the news
coverage of accidents is more intense when the ﬁrm responsible for the accident is bigger.
Disaster news coverage increases when the ﬁrm responsible for the disaster has been of major
concern to journalists shortly before the disaster, and this is the case irrespective of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
features such as size (columns (4)-(6)). On average, a 1% increase in the ﬁrm newsworthiness
variable increases the disaster news coverage by almost two articles in the ﬁrst two days, which
represents a signiﬁcant increase at the 5% level. This result is worth noting because our measure
of the disaster news coverage captures articles related to the disaster (and ignores the other news
articles related to the ﬁrm), so that, all else being equal, ﬁrms under the scrutiny of journalists
before the accident will beneﬁt from higher news coverage in the event of chemical disasters.
One may be concerned that the introduction of the ﬁrm newsworthiness variable in addition to
ﬁnancial controls may spur the regressions. Actually, when the ﬁrm newsworthiness variable is
11excluded from the regression, neither ﬁnancial control is signiﬁcant.
In addition, we document that news pressure is another important predictor of media cov-
erage. On the accident day, intense news pressure, as measured by the time devoted to the top
three news stories in a day, increases the news coverage of disasters. This result is in accordance
with the fact that news about chemical disasters is related to concern over other political issues,
such as wars and terrorist attacks.16 However, the intensity of news pressure decreases at the
10% level the cumulated number of articles on the day. This is in line with our initial assump-
tion that other newsworthy material and intense news pressure crowd out the news coverage of
disasters. From a purely journalistic point of view, the event is more newsworthy when news
pressure related to other events is low (mainly geopolitical events unrelated to the ﬁrm). News
pressure exogenously decreases the magnitude of the disaster news coverage, without aﬀecting
the ﬁrm’s speciﬁc risks, and it is ideally suited to instrument disaster news coverage, more so
than ﬁrm newsworthiness. Finally, news coverage is greater for accidents occurring in the U.S.
compared to accidents occurring in continental Europe. In the ﬁrst two days, accidents occur-
ring in continental Europe receive on average 14 fewer articles (signiﬁcant at the 1% level) than
accidents occurring in the US (see column (6)). Since our sample also includes various non
English-spoken countries such as Japan, this result cannot be due to the fact that newspaper
articles are collected in the English press.
4.2 Eﬀect of Disaster News Coverage on Stock Market Returns
In this section, we document the eﬀect of disaster news coverage on the drop in equity returns
following chemical disasters. To estimate the eﬀect of the disaster news coverage on stock market
returns, a two-equation triangular system is estimated, where the endogenous and dependent
variables are respectively: (i) in the ﬁrst equation, the disaster news coverage, and (ii) in the
second equation, the cumulative abnormal returns. The two variables are regressed on the same
exogenous variables, including a complete set of standard ﬁnancial controls.
Results are reported in Table 6 (columns (4)-(8)), Table 8, Table 7. Table 6 estimates
the contemporaneous eﬀect of the disaster news coverage on the abnormal return using robust
Ordinary Least Squares; Table 8 estimates dynamic equations (i.e. the eﬀect of the disaster news
coverage on the subsequent day abnormal return) using robust Ordinary Least Squares; while
Table 7 estimates contemporaneous equations using Two-stage Least Squares.17 To account for
the eﬀect of delayed news coverage on stock market outcomes, we use Newst=0 and Newst=1
jointly in some model speciﬁcation. Recall that in the ﬁrst two days, the disaster news coverage
is particularly heterogenous, and delayed in some cases (for example, the correlation between
Newst=0 and Newst=1 is of only 60% while the correlation between Newst=1 and Newst=2
is above 90%). In contrast, CumNews[0;+t] is a more conventional measure which captures
the overall intensity of press coverage in the ﬁrst t days after the accident, and deliberately
ignores daily autocorrelation in the news coverage metrics.18 Finally, to account for a potential
non-linear eﬀect of news coverage, we also include the square number of newspaper articles.
Our ﬁrst result is that in the ﬁrst days after the accident, intense media coverage, which
cannot be imputed to fatalities and pollution or to standard ﬁnancial risk-factors, mitigates the
drop in stock returns. In every speciﬁcation, and irrespective of the estimator used (TSLS, or
16In unreported results, we also use a control for the total number of headlines mentioning either the word
"war" or "terrorism", and its coeﬃcient is positive and signiﬁcant.
17Results from a three-stage least squares regression implemented to tackle more precisely the correlation
between equations is not reported, but do provide the same results.
18The cumulated number of news stories avoids problems deriving from the fact that certain disasters may occur
in the late afternoon. Note also that the natural logarithm is used to correct for the right-tailed distribution of
press coverage documented in the Data section.
12OLS), the eﬀect of disaster news coverage on abnormal returns is positive and signiﬁcant at the
5% level (at least). Moreover, both the cumulated number of news articles and the daily number
of articles have a positive eﬀect. As shown in Table 8, in the dynamic equation setting, intensity
of news coverage on the day of the accident helps explain at the 1% level cumulated abnormal
returns on the subsequent days. Finally, there is also strong evidence that the marginal eﬀect
of one additional press article decreases with the total number of press articles available: the
coeﬃcient associated with the square number of press articles introduced in Table 8 and Table 6
is negative and signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Firm newsworthiness and (daily) news pressure prove to be good and valid instruments.
First, as shown in Table 4, instruments are uncorrelated to the severity of disasters; chemical
disasters, in particular, do not inﬂuence the daily news pressure variable. The Cragg-Donald
F-statistic for excluded instruments in the ﬁrst stage is much greater than the critical values for
the weak instrument test based on TSLS size provided by Stock and Yogo (2002), and the partial
R2 for excluded instruments is very high (between 45% and 50%). Finally, over-identiﬁcation
tests (using the Hansen test statistic) are not rejected.
Endogeneity test. Using our instrument variables, we are able to test for the endogeneity
of disaster news coverage with regards to (unexplained) abnormal returns following chemical
disasters. The null hypothesis of news coverage exogeneity is accepted (using the Hausman
speciﬁcation tests), such that the disaster news coverage can be considered as uncorrelated to
other new information arrival at the time of disasters (as measured by the unexplained part of
abnormal returns). This result conﬁrms that the OLS estimator is the most consistent one for
estimating the eﬀect of news coverage on abnormal returns.
5 Discussion and Additional Evidence
5.1 Long-term Evidence
In this section, we document the long-term eﬀect of chemical disasters on stock market returns,
using the cumulated abnormal return up to six months after the accident. Graphically, and using
sub-sample analysis (see Table 3, and, Figure 3), there is clear evidence that in the long-term, the
most publicized accidents, as well as the most serious accidents, are associated with a stronger
drop in equity returns. By way of comparison, cumulated abnormal returns associated with non-
polluting accidents and with the least publicized accidents are close to zero levels. As shown in
Table 3, the diﬀerences in abnormal returns across these sub-samples are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero at the 1% level. However, we also document the observation that polluting accidents
are associated with higher abnormal return variance; test statistics may therefore be overstated.
To counter this problem, we suggest using cross-sectional variance of abnormal returns after the
disaster (rather than historical abnormal return variance) in a multivariate regression setting to
test for diﬀerences across accident sub-samples. In Table 9, we report results from cross-sectional
regressions using robust OLS, where the cumulated abnormal returns up to six months after the
disaster is the dependant variable.
There is clear evidence that over the ﬁrst six month after the disaster, abnormal returns in-
corporate the negative eﬀect associated with pollution news and intense media coverage. Firms
which beneﬁt from more intense news coverage in the ﬁrst three days after the disaster irre-
spective of the accident seriousness also incur lower abnormal returns only twenty days after the
accident. The coeﬃcient associated with news coverage is negative and statistically signiﬁcant at
the 5% level. This result conﬁrms that, all else being equal, marginally more intense press cov-
erage is costly (and potentially, proxies for reputation loss and degradation of the ﬁrm’s image).
At the same time, in Table 9, we document the observation that the marginal loss associated
13with one additional newspaper article is only of 0.03% six months after the accident. Finally,
we document that, after six months, the marginal loss associated with pollution news is 12%.
This eﬀect is both statistically and economically signiﬁcant at the 5% level. This result conﬁrms
that investors are slow to recognize the extent of the loss associated with pollution news. This
result is not surprising since there is great uncertainty surrounding pollution news, with regard
to litigation, reputation risk, and the extent of the damage. In contrast, the eﬀect of the number
of serious injuries and fatalities on abnormal returns in the long-term is not signiﬁcant.
5.2 Eﬀect of the Disaster News Coverage on Abnormal Return Variability
In this section, we investigate the eﬀect of disaster news coverage on the variability of stock
returns. The variance of abnormal returns in the event of disaster is used to capture the un-
certainty (or noisiness) surrounding chemical disaster news. In Table 10, we report results from
robust OLS regressions where abnormal return variance is the dependant variable.
Results document two interesting eﬀects. First, pollution news as measured by the toxic
release dummy increase stock return variance signiﬁcantly (at the 10% level). This result might
conﬁrm that pollution news is associated with greater uncertainty on stock markets. Second,
intense media coverage is associated with return variability of a lower magnitude. The coeﬃcient
of news coverage, measured both on a daily basis and by the cumulated number of news articles,
is negative and signiﬁcant at the 1% level. This result is in line with the fact that news coverage
induce abnormal returns of a lower magnitude following chemical disasters. Even if it is diﬃcult
to disentangle the eﬀect of news coverage on mean abnormal returns from the eﬀect on the return
variance, this result may be due to the fact that intense media coverage reduces information
uncertainty following chemical disasters. Therefore, it might conﬁrm that intense media coverage
marginally alleviates information problems on stock markets.
5.3 Eﬀect of the Disaster News Coverage on Share Trading Volume
We document that chemical disasters are associated with an average abnormal volume of 9% on
the accident day, and that in the subsequent days volume decreases and reaches expected levels
(i.e., zero levels). However, abnormal volume following chemical disasters is also characterized
by a strong variance: for the most serious accidents, the eﬀect on abnormal volume is on average
around 20% on the accident day. On the other hand, certain sub-samples of accidents are also
associated with negative abnormal volumes on the accident day and in the subsequent days.
In this section, we attempt to document this variability in abnormal trading volume following
disasters.
In Table 10, we report results from robust OLS regressions using abnormal trading volumes
in the ﬁrst t days in event-time as dependant variables. Results do not show evidence of any
signiﬁcant determinant to explain the variability in abnormal volumes. This result is surprising,
because it does not conﬁrm preliminary evidence (both graphically and using univariate com-
parisons) that investor attention is driven by the seriousness of disasters. In addition, this result
casts doubt on the investor attention hypothesis that the number of informed investors (or the
salience of news) increases with the intensity of news coverage.
6 Conclusion
In this article, we analyze news coverage following chemical disasters. This subject is relatively
unexplored. In fact, most of the previous literature assumes that press coverage is exogenous, and
does not attempt to model it (Veldkamp (2006) and Kyanezeva (2007) constitute two exceptions).
14Our results can be summarized as follows. First, we show that news coverage is explained by
the social cost of the accident, as measured by the extent of pollution, by the number of fatalities,
and by the number of accidents previously experienced by the ﬁrm. It therefore conﬁrms the
credibility of this disciplinary motive. In the second part of the paper, we investigate the
implications of news coverage on the market value of the ﬁrm that is responsible for the accident.
We emphasize that, in contrast to previous literature on earnings announcements and media, we
consider only the articles that speciﬁcally mention the accident and disregard those that discuss
the ﬁrm for unrelated reasons.
The inclusion of disaster news coverage metrics into the speciﬁcation models doubles their
explanatory power, and conﬁrms previous evidence that the social cost of accidents is incorpo-
rated into stock prices (Cappelle-Blancard and Laguna, 2006). Results can be summarized as
follows. First, disaster news coverage aﬀects stock returns irrespective of the information content
(we do not control for the positive or negative nature of news, for example), and is exogenous
to the unexplained part of the abnormal returns at the time of disasters. Second, we document
instead that intense news coverage is associated with lower losses in the ﬁrst days. Since media
coverage is usually considered as a good proxy for public concern, this result may appear counter
intuitive. We may expect that more publicized disasters would result in a greater reputation loss
for the ﬁrm and, consequently, in larger equity losses. Our results document instead that from
a ﬁnancial point of view, the link between media coverage and stock market outcomes is far less
obvious.
When we look at abnormal returns over the long-run (several months after the accident),
we ﬁnd that intense news coverage increases the drop in stock returns. Therefore, all else being
equal (pollution, human harm, and ﬁrm characteristics), the stock market reaction to intense
press coverage is delayed, and becomes negative only in the long-term. We interpret this latter
result as evidence that investors are slow to recognize the extent of the loss associated with the
implications for the public of news coverage (e.g., image and public trust deterioration). we note
that this result is in line with the evidence of Chan (2003) which documents that prices are slow
to reﬂect bad public news, by contrast with private news. Finally, in contrast with previous
evidence on media and stock markets, we argue that press coverage is not necessarily associated
with increased investor attention, or information of a better quality (Bushee et al., 2007, Peress,
2008). If this were the case, the loss should have increased with media coverage instantaneously
(e.g., due to a greater number of informed investors).
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16Table 1: Summary Statistics
The sample is composed of 64 accidents in the petrochemical industry over the period 1990-2005. Acci-
dents are identiﬁed using the software Factiva. Only publicly listed ﬁrms are considered.
# Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependant Variables
CARt=0 64 -0.81 -0.64 1.57 -6.36 2.93
CAR[0;1] 64 -1.23 -0.93 2.21 -7.35 3.32
CAR[0;2] 64 -1.16 -0.90 2.86 -7.91 5.13
NEWSt=0 64 7.92 2 16.39 0 81
NEWS[0;+1] 64 24.58 7 77.51 0 608
NEWS[0;+2] 64 32.06 10 104.37 1 826
Instrumental Variables
Firm Newsworthiness (%) 64 5.46 4.99 3.15 0.00 20.19
News Pressure 57 8.20 7.50 3.69 4.34 29.25
Explanatory Variables
Ser. injuries and fatalities 64 2.36 1 4.76 0 30
Toxic release 64 0.23 0 0.43 0 1
# previous accidents 64 0.73 0 1.13 0 5
Chemicals 64 0.68 1 0.47 0 1
Dummy year > 1999 64 0.36 0 0.48 0 1
Financial variables
log (Market value) (billion 2005 $) 64 43.36 7.28 74.04 0.09 340.04
Country of listing
US 64 0.36 0 0.48 0 1
EU 64 0.32 0 0.47 0 1
Japan 64 0.11 0 0.31 0 1
Emerging countries 64 0.06 0 0.24 0 1
Country of accident
US 64 0.39 0 0.49 0 1
EU 64 0.33 0 0.47 0 1
Japan 64 0.12 0 0.33 0 1
Emerging countries 64 0.06 0 0.24 0 1
Abbreviations: CAR[0;t]: Cumulative Abnormal Returns up to t days after the accident date averaged across
ﬁrms; NEWS[0;+t]: Number of newspaper articles reporting the disasters for the ﬁrst t days the disaster date
(Factiva database); Ser. injuries and fatalities: Number of serious injuries or fatalities; Toxic release = 1 if the
accident provoked a toxic release and 0 otherwise ; Chemicals = 1 in the ﬁrms belong to the chemical industry
and 0 otherwise; # previous accidents: number of previous accidents experienced by each ﬁrm before the accident
date; Dummy year > 1999 = 1 if the accident occurred after 1999 and 0 otherwise; Firm Newsworthiness is the
ratio of headlines mentioning the ﬁrm over twenty days before disasters to the total number of headlines received
in the previous year (Factiva database); News pressure is the number of minutes devoted to the top three news on
a given day. Mean daily news pressure is 40-day average news pressure (Eisensee and Strömberg, 2007); Market
Value is in billion 2005 constant $. See the text for further details concerning the sample and the variables.
17Figure 1: News coverage and stock market returns following chemical disasters
(a) Cumulative average abnormal returns (in %) with
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Days from disaster 
Fraction 
(b) News stories on disasters (in %), by days from the
disaster
(c) News Articles Density on Day t = 0, 1990 – 2005
Notes: In ﬁgure (a), abnormal returns are computed given the market model parameters estimated with OLS
through the period [-190; -10] in event time. The ﬁgure (c) represents the histogram of the number of news
articles published about the chemical disaster on the accident day (t = 0). Bar width equals 5 articles. The
dark line represents normal ﬁtted distribution. The sample of chemical accidents is from 1990, January to 2005,
March. Event time is days relative to the accident date.
18Figure 2: Daily News Pressure (Eisensee and Strömberg, 2007), by Day
(a) Daily News Pressure (Minutes), 1968 – 2003, by Day. The horizontal ﬂat line
depicts the mean for the 1968—2002 period. The ﬁgure also displays the events
occurring during the peaks of daily news pressure.
(b) News Pressure (Minutes) during 405 Days, 15 March 2001 – 23 Apr 2002, by Day
The ﬁgures are taken from Eisensee and Strömberg (2007) to illustrate major newsworthy events as measured
by the variable daily newspressure. News pressure is the number of minutes devoted to the top three news on a
given day. Mean daily news pressure is 40-day average news pressure. This measure puts an equal weight on all



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































20Table 2: Abnormal Returns and Accident-speciﬁc Characteristics: Univariate Com-
parisons
This presents results from mean comparison test, where the abnormal return variance estimated during the
market model estimation period (t = [ 190; 10] is used to compute the statistics test. In the ﬁrst sub-sample,
the median number of serious injuries and fatalities is used to group the most serious accidents in one sub-sample;
in the second sub-sample, the toxic release dummy is used to distinguish between non-polluting and polluting
accidents; and, ﬁnally, in the third and fourth sub-samples, the median number of press articles published in the
ﬁrst two days after the accident, as well as a dummy for accidents reported either in The Wall Street Journal or
The Financial Times, are used to distinguish between accidents intensively covered by the press from the rest of
accidents.
Two-sample mean
High sample Low sample comparison test
High Low
t Mean Std.Dev. CAAR < 0 Mean Std.Dev. CAAR < 0 Z-stat
Human Harm NHigh=20 NLow=43
0  1:12 0:31 80%  0:58 0:25 67%  6:68
2  1:62 0:54 80%  0:84 0:44 56%  5:61
5  1:85 0:77 70%  0:59 0:63 51%  6:38
10  0:87 1:04 55%  0:47 0:85 51%  1:49
20  2:33 1:44 70%  0:54 1:17 56%  4:84
40  2:71 2:01 75%  1:37 1:66 62%  2:58
60  4:59 2:45 85%  0:86 2:03 52%  5:90
80  5:24 2:82 85%  0:65 2:34 55%  6:28
100  5:13 3:15 80%  1:66 2:61 48%  4:26
120  4:86 3:45 75%  1:68 2:86 50%  3:57
Pollution NHigh=15 NLow=48
0  0:51 0:39 67%  0:83 0:23 73% 2:91
2  1:21 0:69 67%  1:05 0:40 62%  0:85
5  0:38 0:97 53%  1:18 0:57 58% 3:02
10  1:10 1:32 53%  0:44 0:77 52%  1:83
20  1:46 1:83 60%  1:00 1:07 60%  0:92
40  3:27 2:55 67%  1:33 1:51 66%  2:78
60  4:05 3:11 67%  1:43 1:84 62%  3:07
80  5:74 3:59 80%  0:98 2:12 60%  4:86
100  8:37 4:01 67%  1:00 2:37 55%  6:75
120  7:86 4:39 67%  1:07 2:60 55%  5:68
21Table 3: Abnormal Returns and Accident-speciﬁc Characteristics: Univariate Com-
parisons
This presents results from mean comparison test, where the abnormal return variance estimated during the
market model estimation period (t = [ 190; 10] is used to compute the statistics test. In the ﬁrst sub-sample,
the median number of serious injuries and fatalities is used to group the most serious accidents in one sub-sample;
in the second sub-sample, the toxic release dummy is used to distinguish between non-polluting and polluting
accidents; and, ﬁnally, in the third and fourth sub-samples, the median number of press articles published in the
ﬁrst two days after the accident, as well as a dummy for accidents reported either in The Wall Street Journal or
The Financial Times, are used to distinguish between accidents intensively covered by the press from the rest of
accidents.
Two-sample mean
High sample Low sample comparison test
High Low
t Mean Std.Dev. CAAR < 0 Mean Std.Dev. CAAR < 0 Z-stat
Media NHigh=29 NLow=34
0  0:62 0:26 62%  0:86 0:29 76% 3:35
2  0:82 0:45 58%  1:32 0:51 66% 4:03
5  0:77 0:64 54%  1:18 0:73 58% 2:33
10  0:75 0:87 58%  0:47 0:98 48%  1:21
20  1:10 1:21 70%  1:12 1:36 53% 0:05
40  1:47 1:69 75%  2:09 1:93 60% 1:34
60  2:89 2:07 62%  1:33 2:36 63%  2:77
80  3:96 2:38 58%  0:51 2:72 68%  5:31
100  5:25 2:66 50%  0:60 3:04 63%  6:40
120  4:60 2:91 50%  1:04 3:32 63%  4:47
Financial Press NHigh=24 NLow=39
0  0:50 0:26 65%  0:91 0:28 76% 5:86
2  0:68 0:46 68%  1:34 0:48 58% 5:41
5  0:48 0:65 62%  1:30 0:69 52% 4:73
10  0:66 0:88 58%  0:56 0:93 47%  0:43
20  0:92 1:21 72%  1:22 1:29 50% 0:92
40  1:27 1:70 68%  2:11 1:83 63% 1:83
60  2:45 2:07 68%  1:80 2:23 57%  1:15
80  2:47 2:39 75%  1:90 2:57 54%  0:87
100  2:95 2:67 68%  2:65 2:87 48%  0:42
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































23Table 5: News Coverage Determinants following Chemical Disasters
This table reports results from robust OLS regression. The dependant variable is the number of newspapers
articles published about the disaster. Several measures are used: News represents the daily number of articles,
while, Cum:News represents the cumulated number of articles in a given period. In columns (1)-(3), natural
logarithm of the number of newspaper articles is used to correct the news coverage right-tailed distribution.
In columns (4)-(6), the news pressure variable represents the median time spent on top three news segments
(minutes), which is available from 1990-2003. During this period (1990-2003), the disaster news coverage is not
right tailed, and the log transformation is not necessary. Each model includes a complete set of regional dummies
(UK, Emerging countries, Japan, and continental Europe), and a complete set of standard ﬁnancial control
variables. Firm newsworthiness represents the abnormal media coverage in the period [ 22; 2] in event-time.
Standard ﬁnancial control variables include: the ﬁrm close-to-close abnormal returns on each of the previous two
trading days (ARi;t 1, and ARi;t 2); the cumulated abnormal returns in the twenty days before the accident
(CARi;[ 22; 2]); ﬁrm size as measured by the ﬁrm’s log of market capitalization; and book-to-market ratios using
log of book-to-market equity at the end of the most recent year; abnormal trading volume is measured by the
ratio of the number of shares traded to the number of shares outstanding within the twenty days before the
accident date (AVi;[ 22; 2]), using the estimation period t = [ 1Y; 32] to compute the expected level of trading
volume; the Amihud’s illiquidity ratio which is the stock’s absolute daily return divided by its daily trading
volume averaged across the most recent year (Amihud, 2002). The sample period is from 1990 to 2005.
Dependant variable is: Newst=0 Newst=1 Cum:Newst=[0;+1] Newst=0 Newst=1 Cum:Newst=[0;+1]
(log) (log) (log)
Constant 0:113 0:929 0:980  13:829 2:631  11:756
[0:34] [2:22] [2:37] [4:81] [0:52] [1:38]
Fatalities and serious injuries 0:280 0:273 0:325 1:083 1:236 2:503
[4:02] [4:47] [5:07] [2:10] [1:90] [2:42]
Fatalities and serious injuries2  0:007  0:007  0:008  0:048  0:048  0:100
[3:07] [3:68] [4:24] [2:71] [2:26] [2:97]
Toxic release 0:536 0:755 0:822  2:228 0:193  1:745
[1:79] [1:86] [2:09] [0:80] [0:04] [0:27]
# previous accidents 0:325 0:133 0:215 3:656 3:455 7:134
[2:40] [1:22] [1:66] [2:38] [2:05] [2:30]




Average news pressure[0;+1]  0:981  0:062
[1:72] [0:06]
11-sept 15:114 14:877 28:530
[2:47] [1:82] [2:04]
Market value (2005$, log) 0:036 0:124 0:118 1:680 2:519 4:167
[0:47] [1:39] [1:29] [2:23] [2:39] [2:50]
1994 < Y ear < 2000  0:221  0:225  0:247 1:364  2:782  1:641
[0:69] [0:51] [0:59] [0:67] [0:75] [0:35]
> 1999 0:566 0:716 0:746  1:194 3:098 2:352
[1:85] [2:24] [2:17] [0:44] [0:78] [0:38]
Continental Europe  0:292  1:174  1:004  2:424  11:094  14:094
[0:92] [3:86] [2:99] [1:06] [3:57] [2:99]
Emerging countries 0:562  1:396  0:528
[0:80] [2:21] [0:72]
Japan 0:794  0:220 0:209 1:987 1:200 2:771
[2:08] [0:39] [0:38] [0:60] [0:20] [0:35]
UK 0:197  0:606  0:396  4:878  15:994  20:224
[0:29] [0:81] [0:46] [1:17] [2:70] [2:18]
Fin.Controls YES
N 64 64 64 55 55 55
F 9:9288 10:6280 16:2392 11:1813 7:0838 9:0926
Adj. R-squared 0:4665 0:4351 0:4566 0:5905 0:4731 0:5369
Note: Student t-statistics are in brackets: ***, **, * denote statistically signiﬁcance at the 1%, the 5% and the
10% level, respectively.
24Table 6: The Marginal Eﬀect of News Coverage on Stock Returns in the Event of
Chemical Disasters
This table reports results from robust OLS regressions, where the dependent variable is the raw return on
the accident day (Rt, the cumulative abnormal return up to the second day following disasters (CAR[0;+t] for
t = 0;1;2), as well as, in columns (9)-(11), the associated shareholder loss (SL[0;+t] for t = 0;1;2). In columns (5)-
(8), measures of the number of newspapers articles published about the disaster are included: News represents the
daily number of articles, while, Cum:News represents the cumulated number of articles in a given period. Each
model includes a complete set of regional dummies to control for the continent where the accident occurred, as
well as, standard ﬁnancial variables. Standard ﬁnancial control variables include: the ﬁrm close-to-close abnormal
returns on each of the previous two trading days (ARi;t 1, and ARi;t 2; the cumulated abnormal returns in the
twenty days before the accident (CARi;[ 22; 2]); ﬁrm size as measured by the ﬁrm’s log of market capitalization;
and book-to-market ratios using log of book-to-market equity at the end of the most recent year; abnormal trading
volume is measured by the ratio of the number of shares traded to the number of shares outstanding within the
twenty days before the accident date (AVi;[ 22; 2]), using the estimation period t = [ 1Y; 32] to compute the
expected level of trading volume; the Amihud’s illiquidity ratio which is the stock’s absolute daily return divided
by its daily trading volume averaged across the most recent year (Amihud, 2002). Abnormal returns are computed
using the one factor market model. The sample period is from 1990 to 2005. Note: Robust standard errors are
in brackets: ***, **, * denote statistically signiﬁcance at the 1%, the 5% and the 10% level, respectively.
Dependant variable is: Ri;t=0 ARi;t=0 CAR[0;+1] CAR[0;+2] Ri;t=0 ARi;t=0 CAR[0;+1] CAR[0;+2] SLt=0 SL[0;+1] SL[0;+2]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Newst=0 0:136 0:094 0:104
[0:044] [0:031] [0:039]
News2












Fatalities  0:146  0:118  0:113  0:115  0:209  0:164  0:153  0:159  0:171  0:111  0:169
[0:062] [0:044] [0:068] [0:088] [0:046] [0:042] [0:079] [0:089] [0:035] [0:042] [0:060]
Toxic release  0:510 0:013  1:107  0:964  0:769  0:139  1:382  1:171 0:484  0:217  0:900
[0:497] [0:389] [0:573] [0:878] [0:487] [0:357] [0:564] [0:922] [0:459] [0:332] [0:469]
# prev. accidents  0:378  0:409  0:264  0:460  0:529  0:550  0:412  0:597  0:603  0:221  0:046
[0:216] [0:174] [0:235] [0:349] [0:212] [0:175] [0:234] [0:355] [0:272] [0:235] [0:268]
1994 <Year< 2000  0:299  0:483  0:146 0:195  0:094  0:339 0:213 0:414  0:603  0:295  0:155
[0:400] [0:347] [0:542] [0:763] [0:410] [0:338] [0:628] [0:901] [0:363] [0:327] [0:404]
> 1999  0:970  0:467  0:735  0:671  1:601  0:959  1:395  1:222  0:820  0:299  0:667
[0:600] [0:455] [0:663] [0:960] [0:623] [0:503] [0:716] [1:065] [0:446] [0:419] [0:738]
MV ($2005, log) 0:423 0:394 0:530 0:468 0:338 0:330 0:416 0:389  0:228  0:288  0:290
[0:170] [0:133] [0:197] [0:294] [0:151] [0:117] [0:185] [0:308] [0:138] [0:148] [0:250]
Regional dummies YES
Financial controls YES
N 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64
Adj. R-squared 0:1741 0:2397 0:1958 0:0708 0:3087 0:3434 0:2592 0:0671 0:4254 0:3882 0:1988
Note: p-value are in brackets: ***, **, * denote statistically signiﬁcance at the 1%, the 5% and the 10% level,
respectively.
25Table 7: Is News Coverage Exogenous to Stock Returns in the Event of Chemical
Disasters? Two-stage Least Squares Results
This table reports results from the two-stage least squares estimator where the dependent variable is the cu-
mulative abnormal return up to the ﬁrst day following disasters: CAR[0;+t] for t = 0;1, and the endogenous
regressor is the number of newspaper articles published about the disaster on day t = 0;1, instrumented by the
ﬁrm exposure to media before disasters (Firm Newsworthinesst=[ 20; 2]), and the news pressure variable. Each
model includes a complete set of regional dummies (UK, Emerging countries, Japan, and continental Europe).
Standard ﬁnancial control variables include: the ﬁrm close-to-close abnormal returns on each of the previous two
trading days (ARi;t 1, and ARi;t 2); the cumulated abnormal returns in the twenty days before the accident
(CARi;[ 22; 2]); ﬁrm size as measured by the ﬁrm’s log of market capitalization; and book-to-market ratios using
log of book-to-market equity at the end of the most recent year; abnormal trading volume is measured by the
ratio of the number of shares traded to the number of shares outstanding within the twenty days before the
accident date (AVi;[ 22; 2]), using the estimation period t = [ 1Y; 32] to compute the expected level of trading
volume; the Amihud’s illiquidity ratio which is the stock’s absolute daily return divided by its daily trading
volume averaged across the most recent year (Amihud, 2002). Abnormal returns are computed using the one
factor market model. First stage results are not presented. The sample period is from 1990 to 2005.
Dependant variable is: Ri;t=0 ARi;t=0 CAR[0;+1] CAR[0;+1]
Constant 0:164 0:233  0:274  1:174
[0:30] [0:51] [0:43] [1:57]




Fatalities and serious injuries  0:375  0:396  0:547  0:388
[2:97] [3:77] [3:71] [2:57]
Fatalities and serious injuries2 0:006 0:009 0:013 0:009
[1:32] [2:43] [2:68] [1:61]
Toxic release  0:793  0:301  1:473  1:775
[1:82] [0:83] [2:90] [2:85]
# previous accidents  0:648  0:676  0:591  0:416
[2:98] [3:73] [2:33] [1:46]
1994 < Y ear < 2000  0:253  0:603  0:419 0:144
[0:53] [1:51] [0:75] [0:21]
> 1999  2:368  1:783  2:170  1:743
[4:36] [3:94] [3:42] [2:47]
Market value ($2005, log) 0:337 0:271 0:481 0:486
[2:83] [2:72] [3:45] [2:91]
Regional dummies YES
Fin.Controls YES
N 55 55 55 55
F-stat 3:1672 2:9392 3:2225 2:1664
Adj. R-squared 0:3814 0:3513 0:4256 0:1942
Partial R-squared (excl.IV) 48:63 48:63 48:63 55:72
F-stat (excl.IV) 11:67 11:67 11:67 11:33
Sargan 2 3:49 2:31 4:20 13:43
(p-value,%) (17:47) (31:46) (12:24) (0:38)
Wu-Hausman stat. p-value (%) 26:47 25:97 83:66 9:76
Durbin-Wu-Hausman 2 p-value (%) 18:04 17:59 80:29 4:88
Pagan-Hall stat. p-value 94:75(%) 89:40 83:71 80:75
Note: Student t-statistics are in brackets: ***, **, * denote statistically signiﬁcance at the 1%, the 5% and the
10% level, respectively. 26Table 8: Abnormal Return Determinants following Chemical Disasters - Dynamic
Equations
This table reports results from the robust OLS estimator where the dependent variable is the raw return on the
accident day, the cumulative abnormal return up to the second day following disasters: CAR[0;+t] for t = 0;1;2, as
well as, the associated shareholder loss: SL[0;+t] for t = 0;1;2. Each model includes a complete set of dummies to
control for the continent where the accident occurred, as well as, standard ﬁnancial variables. Standard ﬁnancial
control variables include: the ﬁrm close-to-close abnormal returns on each of the previous two trading days
(ARi;t 1, and ARi;t 2; the cumulated abnormal returns in the twenty days before the accident (CARi;[ 22; 2]);
ﬁrm size as measured by the ﬁrm’s log of market capitalization; and book-to-market ratios using log of book-
to-market equity at the end of the most recent year; abnormal trading volume is measured by the ratio of the
number of shares traded to the number of shares outstanding within the twenty days before the accident date
(AVi;[ 22; 2]), using the estimation period t = [ 1Y; 32] to compute the expected level of trading volume; the
Amihud’s illiquidity ratio which is the stock’s absolute daily return divided by its daily trading volume averaged
across the most recent year (Amihud, 2002). Abnormal returns are computed using the one factor market model.
The sample period is from 1990 to 2005.
Dependant variable is: CAR[0;+1] CAR[0;+2] CAR[0;+1] CAR[0;+2]
Constant  0:581  0:399 0:172  0:500
[0:86] [0:56] [0:17] [0:43]












Fatalities and serious injuries  0:555  0:408  0:478  0:498
[3:77] [2:32] [2:08] [1:89]
Fatalities and serious injuries2 0:015 0:010 0:012 0:013
[3:12] [1:81] [1:66] [1:55]
Toxic release  1:845  1:111  0:937  1:613
[3:64] [2:07] [1:16] [1:83]
# previous accidents  0:501  0:702  1:037  0:737
[1:99] [2:38] [2:64] [2:07]
1994 < Y ear < 2000  0:281  0:370  0:064 0:289
[0:51] [0:65] [0:08] [0:30]
> 1999  2:348  1:843  2:051  2:252
[3:12] [2:29] [1:81] [1:79]
Market value ($2005, log) 0:369 0:467 0:394 0:274
[2:40] [2:77] [1:53] [0:97]
Regional dummies YES
Fin.Controls YES
N 64 64 64 64
F-stat 9:3505 15:4949 8:5645 7:1328
R-squared 0:6093 0:5206 0:4209 0:3858
Adj. R-squared 0:4495 0:3395 0:2021 0:1346
Note: Robust standard errors are in brackets: ***, **, * denote statistically signiﬁcance at the 1%, the 5% and
the 10% level, respectively.
27Table 9: Long-term Abnormal Returns Determinants following Chemical Disasters
This table reports results from robust OLS regressions. In columns (1)-(5), the dependent variable is the cumu-
lated abnormal return computed from day t = 2 up to day h = +120;100;80;60;40;20 in event-time, depending
on the model speciﬁcation (CAR[+2;+h]. Each model includes a complete set of regional dummies (UK, Emerging
countries, and Japan, and continental Europe), as well as, standard ﬁnancial variables. Standard ﬁnancial control
variables include: the ﬁrm close-to-close abnormal returns on each of the previous two trading days (ARi;t 1, and
ARi;t 2); the cumulated abnormal returns in the twenty days before the accident (CARi;[ 22; 2]); ﬁrm size as
measured by the ﬁrm’s log of market capitalization; and book-to-market ratios using log of book-to-market equity
at the end of the most recent year; abnormal trading volume is measured by the ratio of the number of shares
traded to the number of shares outstanding within the twenty days before the accident date (AVi;[ 22; 2]), using
the estimation period t = [ 1Y; 32] to compute the expected level of trading volume; the Amihud’s illiquidity
ratio which is the stock’s absolute daily return divided by its daily trading volume averaged across the most
recent year (Amihud, 2002). The sample period is from 1990 to 2005.
Dependant variable is: CARt=[+2;+120] CARt=[+2;+100] CARt=[+2;+80] CARt=[+2;+40] CARt=[+2;+20]
Constant 21:559 10:034 8:351 3:813  0:542
[2:41] [1:32] [1:31] [0:52] [0:15]
Cum:Newst=[0;+1]  0:035  0:023  0:005  0:023  0:017
[1:69] [1:31] [0:33] [2:21] [2:09]
Fatalities and serious injuries 0:461 0:194  0:090  0:025 0:156
[0:89] [0:39] [0:19] [0:08] [1:23]
Toxic release  12:853  8:875  4:010  2:126 0:407
[2:38] [2:22] [0:97] [0:51] [0:17]
# previous accidents  0:268 0:880 0:148  1:113  0:411
[0:12] [0:46] [0:09] [0:81] [0:48]
> 1999  6:147  0:317 1:611 2:915 3:306
[1:11] [0:08] [0:43] [0:90] [2:03]
1994 < Y ear < 2000  6:060  4:505  4:402 0:248 2:698
[0:99] [0:87] [0:98] [0:07] [1:29]
Market value ($2005, log) 0:443 0:221  0:628 0:576  0:014
[0:29] [0:21] [0:63] [0:65] [0:03]
Regional Dummies YES
Fin.Controls YES
N 64 64 64 64 64
F-stat 3:25 4:88 5:00 2:79 6:18
R-squared (%) 59:98 56:17 53:47 36:89 52:15
Adj. R-squared (%) 32:19 26:55 2203  5:75 19:82
Note: Robust Student t-statistics are in brackets: ***, **, * denote statistically signiﬁcance at the 1%, the 5%
and the 10% level, respectively.
28Table 10: Abnormal Return Variability and Abnormal Volume Determinants follow-
ing Chemical Disasters
This table reports results from a robust OLS regression. In columns (1)-(3), the dependent variable is the
abnormal return variability on day t = 0;1, as measured by the square level of the abnormal return, while in
columns (4)-(5), the dependant variable is the average logged abnormal volume on day t = 0 and in the period
t = [0;+1]. Each model includes a complete set of regional dummies (UK, Emerging countries, and Japan, and
the reported dummy for continental Europe), as well as, standard ﬁnancial variables. Standard ﬁnancial control
variables include: the ﬁrm close-to-close abnormal returns on each of the previous two trading days (ARi;t 1, and
ARi;t 2); the cumulated abnormal returns in the twenty days before the accident (CARi;[ 22; 2]); ﬁrm size as
measured by the ﬁrm’s log of market capitalization; and book-to-market ratios using log of book-to-market equity
at the end of the most recent year; abnormal trading volume is measured by the ratio of the number of shares
traded to the number of shares outstanding within the twenty days before the accident date (AVi;[ 22; 2]), using
the estimation period t = [ 1Y; 32] to compute the expected level of trading volume; the Amihud’s illiquidity
ratio which is the stock’s absolute daily return divided by its daily trading volume averaged across the most
recent year (Amihud, 2002). Abnormal returns are computed using the one factor market model. The sample
period is from 1990 to 2005.







Constant 3:942 2:545 3:235 29:297 27:219
[1:86] [2:16] [2:63] [0:99] [0:80]




Fatalities and serious injuries 0:469 0:118 0:087 2:684 1:947
[2:55] [1:02] [0:73] [1:49] [1:14]
Toxic release 0:229 2:119 2:214  6:429  8:112
[0:17] [1:77] [1:71] [0:29] [0:37]
# previous accidents 0:204 0:527 0:320 12:252 10:137
[0:38] [1:58] [0:99] [1:43] [1:31]
1994 < Y ear < 2000 0:155  1:507  1:425  3:138  0:108
[0:11] [1:62] [1:53] [0:12] [0:00]
> 1999 3:411 2:543 2:547  1:279  3:429
[2:49] [2:39] [2:32] [0:07] [0:18]
Market value ($2005, log)  0:483  0:550  0:488  10:758  10:775
[1:21] [1:90] [1:77] [2:43] [2:34]
Regional dummies YES
Fin.Controls YES
N 64 64 64 56 56
F-stat 2:2436 1:6278 1:5595 4:0775 3:3945
R-squared (%) 36:31 43:64 41:30 29:91 28:63
Adj. R-squared (%) 15:99 25:65 22:57 03:63 1:87
Note: Robust Student t-statistics are in brackets: ***, **, * denote statistically signiﬁcance at the 1%, the 5%
and the 10% level, respectively.
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